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INTERNAL DEMARKETING AMONGST 




David M. Brown, PhD 
Newcastle Business School, Northumbria University,  





This chapter uses fresh qualitative data to explore experiences of Internal 
Demarketing (ID) within organisations which had suffered financial crises as a result of 
either macroenvironmental or microenvironmental factors. By considering how 
demarketing theory and extant Internal Marketing literature can inform a 
reconceptualization of ID, it analyses emerging themes which suggest at least a 
perception amongst employees that ID has been deployed with organisational intent. By 
focusing on two case studies drawn from a much larger project, and by using publicly 
available information on the organisations and participants’ contextualisations, it suggests 
that, on the balance of probability, ID is undertaken with organisational intent in at least 
some instances, and this is more likely amongst organisations seeking to emerge from 
financial crises. Moreover, constituent forms of ID are identified and their characteristics 
unpacked. 
 





Internal demarketing (ID) is a recently recognised phenomenon in which an organisation 
markets itself badly to its employees. In identifying the phenomenon for the first time, 
Vasconcelos (2008) proposed that ID is an unintentional consequence of botched internal 
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marketing (IM) – an organisation attempting to make itself more attractive to its internal 
audience through its values and communications but failing to such an extent that the reverse 
becomes true. However, recent empirical research (Brown, Dey, Wäppling & Woodruffe-
Burton, 2019) has raised the possibility of IM being used by some organisations intentionally 
to differing extents towards segments of their workforces, thereby lowering the attractiveness 
of the organisation to some employees. This chapter begins by revisiting the theoretical 
debate on IM, before analysing the characteristics underpinning the initial conceptualisation 
of ID, placing them within the broader context of demarketing theory, and deliberating over 
the applicability of their features – and particularly intent – to the context of organisations and 
their workforces. To do this, fresh empirical data is used, drawing on semi-structured 
phenomenological interviews seeking a ‘bottom-up’, employee perspective within several 
economically developed countries. These suggest at least partial organisational intent behind 
some instances of internal demarketing, and that the phenomenon appears much more 
prevalent amongst organisations seeking to recover from financial crises. These include 
macroenvironmental events such as the 2007-9 Financial Crisis and the accompanying 
downturn in consumer confidence, and microenvironmental events such as attacks from 





As organisations become more sophisticated and successful in their marketing to 
prospects and customers, it is natural that they might seek to maximise the benefits of this 
expertise by targeting it at additional audiences of stakeholders, such as their employees. 
Whilst staff differ from customers inasmuch as they have limited ability to avoid the 
marketing advances of the organisation (Christopher et al. 1991), the central ethos of IM is 
that it is non-coercive, interactive and consensual and, as such, delivers mutual benefits for 
both the staff members and employer (Kotler & Levy, 1969). IM may occur within meetings, 
emails, staff competitions or incentives. It may take the form of notice board announcements 
and posters, casual dress codes, staff subsidies, informal canteens, mentoring or job 
shadowing. And these lists are far from exhaustive. Being a specialist form of Relationship 
Marketing, it seeks to create mutual value during the multiple ‘touch points’ at which two or 
more entities interact during their longitudinal journey. An employee who is subjected to 
accomplished and sincere IM is likely to feel valued, understood and respected by their 
employer, assuming the individual staff member is open-minded and receptive to such 
approaches. They are likely to perceive benefits such as increased job satisfaction and self-
esteem, professional pride, feelings of professional fulfilment and belonging, security, 
camaraderie and comradeship. All these affective outcomes present themselves in fresh data 
collected and analysed for this chapter. Moreover, some of the policy makers interviewed 
(though admittedly a small minority) declared such outcomes alone as sufficient to justify the 
deployment of company resources. However, the pursuit of organisational benefits motivates 
almost all cases of IM adoption and is at the heart of the theoretical debate. 
In transferring some of the benefits of traditional marketing from its external customer-
facing context to its internal environment, a firm can leverage existing synergies for a 
perceived advantage (e.g., – Christopher, Payne & Ballantyne, 1991). Effectively, if its 
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managers consider its existing marketing expertise, investment and operations as a fixed cost 
which it has already invested, and the targeting of these efforts at each stakeholder group to 
be an additional variable cost, then increasing the total audience scope must therefore reduce 
the cost per ‘recipient’ or audience member. Naturally, this only holds true if one assumes 
that some sort of commercial reward can continue to be harvested despite the turning inward 
of efforts. Those organisations undertaking IM activities as a secondary strategy simply 
because “we have already done the hard part” may not represent its most devoted 
philosophical adherents, but reflect a pragmatism underpinning most IM adoption. 
A common motivation behind IM adoption is the need to recruit, satisfy and retain high 
quality staff (Berry, 1984; Glassman & McAfee, 1992; Quester & Kelly, 1999; Gounaris, 
2006). A high staff churn rate necessitates a heavy investment in re-recruitment, unsettles 
those staff who stay, and risks alienating customers who crave some continuity from one 
encounter with the firm to the next. It is a marketing truism that it costs several times as much 
to recruit a customer than to retain one (Reichheld & Kenny, 1990), whilst Reinartz, Thomas 
& Kumar (2005) found that underinvestment in both areas damages Return on Investment 
more than overinvestment does, and that straying more than 10% either way from the ideal 
investment level yields no more than a 1% return. As many organisations view IM as a 
relocation of external marketing practices into an internal environment, it seems logical that 
they might also relocate such commercial considerations from external to internal stakeholder 
relationships. Naturally, this also makes the possibility of deliberately demarketing to staff 
appear highly fanciful at first sight, until we consider in more detail the segmentable nature of 
the workforce. 
IM is invariably intended to improve staff performance levels (Berry & Parasuraman, 
1991; Christopher et al. 1991; Ballantyne, 1997; Ballantyne, 2000). This may be achieved by 
enabling the recruitment and retention of better staff, removing the necessity to retain or 
recruit inferior staff, and by maximising the effectiveness of those in situ. The key strategy to 
achieve this is to orient staff towards the organisation’s customers (Grönroos, 1981; George, 
1990; Christopher et al. 1991; Ballantyne, 1997; Awwad & Agti, 2011; Day, 2012) by 
instilling a better awareness of, and empathy towards, customers and their concerns. For 
‘boundary spanners’ – those employees such as salespeople who span the customer-firm 
divide – this may reflect the inescapable everyday reality of their roles. To others deep within 
the organisation, IM may need to address more entrenched insularity by encouraging all 
colleagues to treat each other as internal customers to whom service, value and respect are 
paramount, and to consider their own jobs as internal products (Berry, 1984; Berry & 
Parasuraman, 1991; Greene, Walls & Schrest, 1994; Ballantyne, 1997; Caruana & Calleya, 
1998; Lings, 2004) to be aspired to, co-constructed and aligned to their identities. 
By uniting staff from different departments and levels of seniority within organisations, 
IM helps to facilitate relational networks and interactivity (Varey, 1995; Voima, 2001; Lings, 
2004). For example, an IM initiative may include a team bonding session off-site – a 
corporate ‘away day’ in which employees are teamed with colleagues from other functions 
and with whom they would usually have little contact, to work on a challenging problem – 
and this may raise awareness of what help and collaborative opportunities are available in 
previously overlooked parts of the organisation. As such, IM not only instigates an increased 
level of internal communications (Varey, 1995; Hogg, Carter & Dunne, 1998; Rafiq & 
Ahmed, 2000; Kale, 2012), both inter-departmentally and intra-hierarchically, but also 
encourages internal market exchange and research, facilitating knowledge transmission and 
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the growth of organisational competencies (Ballantyne, 1997; Ballantyne, 2000; Ahmed & 
Rafiq, 2003; Gounaris, 2006; Lindner & Wald, 2011). A pertinent example of this is the US 
industrial giant, 3M, which invests heavily in nurturing interfunctionality to create a 
borderless environment in which innovation can flourish. In the late 1960s, a New Product 
Development Designer named Art Fry attended a seminar delivered by a scientist, Spencer 
Silver, from a different department. Such fluidity of organisational learning was central to 
3M’s ethos and consistent with an IM perspective. Although the weak adhesive invented by 
Silver seemingly had no logical application, Fry remembered the seminar some years later 
when, opening his hymn book at choir practice, the page markers fell to the ground. Realising 
the need to secure bookmarks with an adhesive strong enough to hold them in place but weak 
enough not to damage the page, his mind cast back to Silver’s weak adhesive and, as a result, 
Post-It Notes were invented. The resulting product has been phenomenally successful in 
many countries and helped to raise awareness of the 3M brand amongst new markets and 
customers. Whilst 3M cannot have knowingly implemented IM (as their approach predated 
the concept of IM by over a decade), its organisational stance is entirely congruent with the 
emphasis on empowerment, integration and learning at the heart of IM. Perhaps tacitly, it had 
employed an IM mindset to streamline internal processes, integrate colleagues and discourage 
silo mentality (Reardon & Enis, 1990; Christopher et al. 1991; Rafiq & Ahmed, 1993; Varey, 
1995; Ballantyne, 1997; Varey & Lewis, 1999; Ballantyne, 2000; Kelemen, 2000; Hume & 
Hume, 2014). 
As we have seen so far, IM should act as an agent for organisational change (Reardon & 
Enis, 1990; Christopher et al. 1991; Rafiq & Ahmed, 1993; Varey, 1995; Varey & Lewis, 
1999; Winston & Cahill, 2012). Indeed, after mergers and acquisitions, during times of flux, 
and when organisations are rebranding or entering a turnaround period, the efficacy of IM is 
usually unleashed. In an example arising from recent interview data, a manager within a 
“traditional, old school insurance company full of suits and ties” described how his 
organisation had merged with a “very go-ahead, informal telesales-type insurance company 
with colourful branding and young staff in polo shirts.” The two companies’ contrasting 
levels of formality and tradition needed to be reconciled or moderated within the resulting 
organisation, and it used a range of IM tactics to do this – corporate ‘away days’ and team 
bonding sessions, ‘town hall meetings’ in which senior managers communicated their vision, 
buddying and shadowing schemes in which silos were dismantled by interdepartmental 
mentoring, and training programmes expressing a commonality of purpose and organisational 
intent. Indeed, a key managerial motivation for the implementation of IM strategies is to 
manage the organisational culture (Gummesson, 1987; George, 1990; Piercy & Morgan, 
1991; Keleman & Papasolomou-Doukakis, 2004) and motivate staff towards the achievement 
of organisational goals (Grönroos, 1981; Berry & Parasuraman, 1991; Rafiq & Ahmed, 1993; 
Conduit & Mavondo, 2001). 
Whilst IM has never been proposed as a panacea for all organisational ills, the extant 
literature examining it and proposing its applications is relatively utopian and uncritical. The 
exception to this is Hales (1994), a Human Resources Management academic who resented 
IM being used as a conduit for, or a constituent of, Human Resources strategy (Collins & 
Payne, 1991; Hales, 1994), arguing that it was either trespassing on the rightful terrain of 
HRM or simply rebadging well established HRM practices in a flash of intellectual 
gimmickry. The literature usually focuses on the organisational benefits, predominantly in 
terms of a more motivated and productive workforce which is more understanding of, and 
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aligned towards, its customers and therefore able to generate commercial rewards. Although 
most seminal sources dedicate a paragraph or two to the benefits which may be enjoyed by 
employees, these considerations are almost always secondary and a means to an end. As a 
result, the literature is dominated by top-down, organisational, commercial perspectives at the 
expense of bottom-up, employee-oriented, relational perspectives. This seems at odds with 
the very ethos of IM and its situatedness within the Relationship Marketing paradigm 
(Christopher et al. 1991) which bestows ‘relational’ rather than ‘transactional’ values 
(Grönroos, 1981). It also contradicts the accepted distinction between IM and HRM which 
maintains that only IM works independently of contractual leverage and coercion (Rafiq & 
Ahmed, 1993) – a distinction likely to be contested by HRM commentators - thereby 
undermining the very legitimisation of IM as a separate field. IM is dialectical and strives for 
consensual exchange (Voima, 2001) through reward and referent power rather than the 
imposition of top-down diktat through legitimate or coercive power (French & Raven, 1959). 
In extreme cases, IM strategies built upon little or no employee input may be rejected or 
derided by staff, whose alienation may result in ‘brand saboteur’ behaviours and resentment 





The concept of demarketing – as counterintuitive as it may at first seem – was introduced 
by Kotler & Levy (1969) and is the outcome of strategies and tactics which reduce demand 
for products or services (Mark & Brennan, 1995), rather than increasing it (Bradley & Blythe, 
2014). Although subsequent development of the concept has been patchy, Medway, Warnaby 
& Dharni (2010) broadened it to include reductions in demand for places, in addition to 
brands and organisations, whilst Wright & Egan (2000) noted demarketing’s potential in 
moderating societal behaviours. In recent years, the concept has been partially incorporated 
into wider theoretical debates, such as those surrounding sustainability and environmentalism, 
and marketing’s role in driving these (Sodhi, 2011; Armstrong Soule & Reich, 2016). Used 
by marketers to counterbalance the lack of price-sensitivity when discouraging consumption 
or over-consumption of deleterious products (Lowe, Lynch & Lowe, 2016), it has helped to 
nudge populations towards more healthy drinking habits (Burton, Dadich & Soboleva, 2013) 
and away from smoking (White & Thomas, 2015; Chauhan & Setia, 2016). It has also been 
highly instrumental in discouraging the purchase of single use plastics (Eagle, Harmann & 
Low, 2016) and tourism within environmentally sensitive regions (Armstrong & Kern, 2011), 
amongst others. Nonetheless, the concept of demarketing is under-recognised by practitioners 
and educators and remains niche. 
Six main categories of demarketing were proposed by Bradley & Blythe (2014), and 
these considered not only the outcomes of the marketing actions, but the intent underpinning 
them. The broad term, general demarketing, was used to describe an intentional attempt to 
reduce demand for something across all customer or prospect types (Skinner, 2014). As such, 
it does not target a specifically segmented audience, and is transparent in its intent. In 
synchromarketing products and services are marketed when supply is able to fulfil a higher 
demand than is present but not when demand is much higher than supply levels (Martinez-
Ruiz, 2014). By reacting to the peaks and troughs of demand and attempting to moderate their 
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effects and align them more closely with supply, it seems unlikely that many organisations 
would actively demarket for phases, but rather passively choose not to market, thereby 
maintaining a useful level of customer desire for when supply increases. If this is the case, it 
can barely be considered demarketing.  
Unintentional demarketing may share its outcomes with general demarketing, but none of 
its intent, being the unwanted result of well-meant but poorly designed or mismanaged 
marketing – it is when a reduction in demand is achieved despite an increase in demand 
having been the aim (Kirchner, 2014; Madichie, 2014). As we shall explore later, the first 
conceptualisation of ID (Vasconcelos, 2008) applied these conditions to the internal market, 
and we shall debate this at length. Counter-marketing is the intentional demarketing, 
especially by government bodies, of products, services or behaviours which may be harmful 
or undesirable (Boddy, 2014). Campaigns to discourage drink-driving, alcohol and substance 
misuse fall into this category. Occasionally an organisation may wish to demarket its own 
products for a period of time for ethical reasons, as was the case when the adventure clothing 
manufacturer, Patagonia, asked people to forego new clothes purchases for a day in favour of 
repairing and recycling them, thereby protecting the earth’s resources. Naturally, by 
communicating its ethos of sustainability, Patagonia may have attracted incremental demand 
over a longer timescale through what was cause-related marketing, and this potentially opens 
a debate over whether such ‘sprat to catch a mackerel’ demarketing is really covertly 
intentioned traditional marketing.  
Ostensible marketing is the intentional attempt to decrease customer demand whilst 
giving the outward impression that one wishes to increase it (Croft, 2014; McKechnie, 2014). 
It seems perhaps likely that the opposite approach - ostensible demarketing, or appearing to 
intentionally dissuade custom whilst surreptitiously attracting it (Kotler & Levy, 1969) – 
could have broader commercial applications, especially for aspirational brands which seek an 
aloofness, or from those postmodern brands which wish to convey a spirit of ‘sprezzatura’ by 
being cool without appearing to try. Selective demarketing may also be covert but seeks a 
reduction in demand only from a targeted section of an organisation’s customer base whilst 
protecting its sales amongst other, more valued segments (Kotler & Levy, 1969; Bradley & 
Blythe, 2014; Farquhar, 2014; Tan, 2014). Indeed, by demarketing its products or services to 
a customer segment deemed less ‘desirable’, a brand may increase its attractiveness to others 
in a manner which goes beyond a traditional understanding of segmented marketing. In the 
wake of 2007-9 Financial Crisis, many of the UK’s high street banks made their financial 
products less attractive to casual savers and domestic mortgagees as they wished to reorient 
their investments. To understand whether this constitutes demarketing – it may be considered 
a simple and innocuous case of targeting whichever segment is more profitable – one must 
have a clear idea of the level of organisational intent and the extent to which customers have 
been purposely ‘sacked’, but such intentions are invariably obscured. After all, which CEO 
would admit to trying to get rid of poorer customers? Perhaps selective demarketing, where it 
occurs, is more often achieved through an intersection of ostensible marketing and selective 
marketing – a hybrid form of manipulating demand which allows firms to claim legitimately 
that they have courted one customer segment, rather than stating how other segments were, by 
default, a neglected by-product of such a strategy. It seems likely that this obfuscation, or at 
least a blurring of boundaries, has deterred theorists from critically challenging Vasconcelos’ 
(2008; 2011) conceptualisation of IM as a form of unintentional demarketing, and we turn to 
this question next. 
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INTERNAL DEMARKETING 
 
Vasconcelos (2008) introduced the concept of ID, providing a list of managerial and 
organisational antecedents, identifying actions which constitute ID, and explaining their 
possible consequences. He suggested that ID is inadvertently botched IM brought about by 
organisational incompetence, lack of foresight, bad planning or insufficiently skilled 
managers, amongst other factors. As such, his conceptualisation of ID was as a form of 
unintentional demarketing situated within the organisation, but perhaps even stronger than 
most forms of unintentional demarketing as it not only lacked organisational intent but 
actually represented the opposite outcomes to those intended by the organisation. In other 
words, he saw ID not as a passive and unintentional form of inattentive strategic drift, but as 
the unwanted outcome of an active and well-intentioned organisational strategy.  
The deleterious outcomes of ID identified by Vasconcelos (2008; 2011) include a 
reduction in organisational identity amongst employees. As IM is intended to positively 
differentiate an employer from its rival organisations in the minds of staff, damaging this 
identity represents a commodification of the firm which could, through increased employer-
employee psychic distance, erode staff loyalty, lower staff barriers to exit and result in an 
unhealthy staff churn rate which impacts upon recruitment costs and continuity of 
organisational knowledge. He suggested that ID would impact negatively on employees’ 
perceptions of the organisation and of their colleagues, which would be likely to produce 
several outcomes running against the aims of IM, such as discouraging interdepartmental and 
interpersonal collaboration (thereby possibly hindering innovation and organisational 
entrepreneurship), laying the foundations of a silo mentality, and removing a motivation for 
staff to treat each other as internal customers worthy of high levels of service. It also seems 
almost certain to undermine staff morale, thus stimulating a damaging cycle in which 
negative affect and behaviour continuously feed each other. The outcomes suggested are 
likely to trigger a decline in productivity at both an organisational and individual level, and a 
workforce which is less oriented towards its market and less focused on its customers and 
stakeholders.  
The symptoms of ID suggested by Vasconcelos (2008) included an environment of 
distrust amongst colleagues and between staff of differing hierarchical levels, low levels of 
staff commitment towards the organisation and each other, and an increase in employee 
dissatisfaction, all in direct contradiction to IM’s aims. If one is to accept his 
conceptualisation of ID as the unwanted outcomes of botched but intentional IM approaches, 
rather than a passive drifting lacking in any organisational intent, a firm’s managers are likely 
to be alert to such negative symptoms as they should be actively monitoring their internal 
environment for positive responses to their intended IM, and more likely to act quickly by 
initiating remedial actions. However, if one is to accept the possibility of ID evolving through 
neglect over a long time span, it is less likely that management would be vigilant to such 
negative symptoms, or ready and prepared to implement corrective strategies. Moreover, if 
IM is the use of existing marketing competencies internally (Christopher et al. 1991) and ID 
is to be considered an unintentionally botched form of IM (Vasconcelos, 2008), then it seems 
plausible that both IM and ID would be segmented, as segmentation of audiences is key to 
marketing to customers. Is it realistic to expect organisations to eschew segmentation in 
favour of a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach when redirecting marketing efforts at their employees, 
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given its dominance in other markets? If not, it would appear not as Crook & Combs’ (2007, 
p.546) “rising tide that lifts all boats equally,” but a phenomenon demanding a more nuanced 
exploration to ascertain if it affects certain employees differently to others. 
A key strength of Vasconcelos’ (2008) article, both to theorists and managerial 
practitioners, was his identification of seven antecedents of ID, which are considered here. 
The first of these was ‘people devaluing’, by which he meant not just the unconscious failure 
to value employees sufficiently, but also the rather more cognitive state of deprioritising the 
needs of internal stakeholders. This distinction is interesting, as it introduces a level of choice 
and willingness which, whilst not necessarily indicating active intent, appears to go slightly 
beyond passiveness and accident. The next antecedent, ‘quality of working life unconcern’ is 
similarly problematic and open to ambiguity. The word ‘unconcern’ conveys a passive, 
uncaring lack of regard for employees’ happiness and welfare at work, and a willingness to 
neglect. However, if organisations seek to improve quality of working life in order to retain 
valued employees when staff retention is most desirable (e.g., – during times of economic 
growth), is it not therefore possible that an organisation could purposely worsen quality of 
working life during periods of redundancies and rationalisation, when demand for its ‘job 
products’ (Berry, 1981; Ballantyne, 1987) is much more inelastic in relation to their 
attractiveness due to employment insecurity and a declining number of alternative jobs? 
Moreover, if the ‘quality of working life unconcern’ is matched by an unconcern for the needs 
or satisfaction of commercial customers, it is likely to be an outcome of poor organisational 
direction or poorly motivated or trained managers, whereas if the regard for external 
customers’ needs remains high but concern for employee needs is low, that appears indicative 
of a conscious prioritisation, or at least a mindset which is directly at odds with the 
philosophy of IM, thereby casting into doubt whether such unconcern could be an unintended 
result of IM. 
The next two of Vasconcelos’ (2008) antecedents of ID, ‘lack of vision’ and ‘weak 
leadership’, seem entirely consistent with any form of unintentional demarketing, although 
they may perhaps be considered supra-constructs encapsulating other, more specific, 
shortcomings. ‘Patchy or non-existent communication’ could possibly be an outcome, or at 
least the means by which an outcome is suffered, rather than purely an antecedent, and the 
term would have benefited from clarification given the range of constituent considerations – 
messages, media and symbolism, to name just a few – within communications. Likewise, 
‘psychological contract violation’ and ‘the contagion of distrust’, whilst likely antecedents of 
ID, may also be outcomes or, indeed, both antecedents and outcomes iteratively fuelling each 
other. 
It is worth noting that all Vasconcelos’ (2008) identified antecedents are at managerial 
and organisational level. This presents two possible shortcomings. If IM takes a dyadic 
approach (Yang & Coates, 2010) to its ‘internal customers’ (Berry, 1981; Ballantyne, 1997) 
and, as a form of Relationship Marketing, must use not only ‘organisation-to-customer’ 
actions but also ‘customer-to-organisation’ and ‘customer-to-customer’ ones, then 
antecedents to both IM and ID should also occur at a staff level. Moreover, although different 
organisations react differently to external pressures – for example, some might react to a 
recession by rationalising their workforces and reducing headcount whilst others might seek 
to reassure, satisfy and retain staff, ready to attack the market when more favourable trading 
conditions emerge – it might be pertinent to consider the potential implications of external 
antecedents, such as financial crises. Such a research ambition is certainly problematic - and 
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especially for the qualitative researcher whose purpose is not to prove correlation or causality 
- due to the extreme unlikelihood of executives declaring that their ID may have been 
intentional and a reaction to external pressures. After all, ID is seen as damaging to the 
organisation’s performance and the wellbeing of staff. However, by placing an organisation’s 
IM or ID within the broader context of its stated strategic responses to its external 
environment, it is sometimes possible to provide a ‘smoking gun’ – not to prove beyond all 
reasonable doubt that ID has been driven by organisational intent, but at least to make such a 
judgment on the balance of probability. An example of this was provided by Brown et al. 
(2019) in their study of ID within the UK Civil Service (i.e., – central government 
departments) since the 2007-2009 financial crisis. Although categorical proof of 
organisational intent could not be provided for the ID which surfaced unanticipatedly 
amongst interviews with many of the participants in a study of IM, by placing the 
organisation within the context of its austerity era Public Relations statements and publicly 
available policy documents, it was possible to demonstrate the high probability that ID was 
intentional. In the next section, we examine some of the findings from that study and other 
research conducted in the public and private sector and discuss the likelihood of 
organisational intent given the broader context available elsewhere. 
 
 
REVISITING INTERNAL DEMARKETING THROUGH FRESH DATA 
 
The Methodological Approach 
 
This investigation of ID occurred in an unanticipated manner during a much broader 
study of IM, its dyadic interactions and its conceptualisation. As a key aim of the research 
was to redress the dominance within extant literature of top-down organisational perspectives 
and commercially driven analysis, it used numerous (n = 42) semi-structured 
phenomenological interviews of actors at varying levels of seniority and authority within IM 
campaigns – directors, managers and general members of staff. They represented an almost 
equal gender split and a wide range of age groups. An initial wave of participants was 
recruited from the researcher’s contacts on Linkedin and interviewed at their work premises 
(with informed individual and organisational consent), off-site or via Skype. A further two 
rounds of participants were recruited through snowball sampling, so that around half of all 
interviewees were previously unknown to the researcher. Of these, some worked at the same 
organisations as earlier participants and some did not. A small number were retired or 
temporarily unemployed and, like some working participants, chose to reflect upon their 
experiences in one or more previous organisations. The working interviewees were employed 
in a mixture of SMEs, larger and international firms, public sector and third sector 
organisations. These were located within all nations of the United Kingdom, Ireland, The 
Netherlands, the United States, Canada, Germany, Belgium and Australia.  
Transcriptions of recorded interviews were subjected to thematic analysis, and the scope 
of later interviews evolved to explore further interesting themes emerging from the earlier 
ones – hence the introduction of interviews specifically focused on ID part way through this 
process. Interviews in which ID was intended to be the focus were conducted at neutral 
venues or participants’ homes, as per Fahie’s (2014) process for undertaking sensitive 
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qualitative research on topics such as workplace bullying. In all cases, participants’ identities 
have been obscured. Complementary desk research of secondary, publicly available data was 
also undertaken to establish the broader organisational contexts (e.g., – if the employer was 
increasing or decreasing staff numbers, freezing wages, addressing a pension fund ‘black 
hole’, or implementing compulsory or voluntary redundancies). It must be reiterated that 
proving ID beyond reasonable doubt is not possible but making a judgment on the balance of 
probabilities is. 
 
Case 1: Jack, the Retired Regional Sales Manager 
To analyse the emerging and then recurring theme of ID, we shall examine the 
experiences two key participants on a case-by-case basis, before identifying thematic 
commonality between them. 
In case 1, Jack was a retired Regional Sales Manager who had worked 18 years for a 
prominent motor manufacturer. His tenure had ended through compulsory redundancy a few 
years before he had planned to retire, as part of a restructuring exercise in which headcount 
was reduced through the use of outsourcing. Jack recalled his employer’s long-term 
commitment to IM: 
 
“As far back as I remember, XXXX wanted to have a strong dialogue with staff. I 
think this was all members of staff, but certainly there was more emphasis on people like 
me who were representing the company and trying to push dealers to sell more.” 
 
Although he paints a very positive picture (at least initially), he immediately reveals that 
the organisation’s IM is not one-size-fits-all but targeted more strenuously at ‘boundary 
spanners’ – those people dealing with external stakeholders. Naturally, this is not necessarily 
damaging or alienating, and could be commercially appropriate, but it certainly suggests a 
differentiated or segmented approach to IM which is overlooked in the extant literature and 
submerged beneath the mantra of Crook & Combs’ (2007, p.546) “rising tide that lifts all 
boats equally.” He explains one form of IM: 
 
“Over the years we had lots of trips to foreign production plants where we saw the 
vehicles being built. We would always run some sort of competition and the winning 
dealers would send their best salespeople and the dealer principal. We’d have a couple of 
days at a beach resort thrown in and it would be a chance to get to know dealers and other 
colleagues better and, well, I suppose humanise the relationship so that you could pull in 
favours like getting vehicles released urgently from the compound.” 
 
Evidently, the IM was aimed at nurturing interdepartmental collaboration (Christopher et 
al. 1991; Kelemen, 2000) and encouraging communication between staff (Varey, 1995; Kale, 
2012) for commercial organisational benefits, and these themes continue into the 
organisation’s other IM activities: 
 
“We had all sorts: regular product knowledge training sessions where we were taken 
off-site for a few days to a country hotel and got to drive all the latest vehicles; lunch 
events for the top salespeople to dine with the directors; job shadowing so that the 
youngsters could learn the tricks of the trade from the old timers; lots of email campaigns 
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and charity fundraising events; we also had an MD near the end of my time who liked to 
have these ‘town hall meetings’, which were something I’d not heard of and an American 
thing, but basically he would stand on a box and brief staff about the latest company 
developments every month or so.” 
 
Jack described a range of IM media and methods (emails, meetings, briefings, training, 
team bonding sessions, hospitality, competitions), which vary greatly in levels of formality 
and style. He also introduced some of the perceived motivations or rationale behind his 
organisation’s IM – the internal transfer of knowledge (Gounaris, 2006), internal 
communications (Varey, 1995; Kale, 2012), the building of relational networks and 
interaction (Varey, 1995; Voima, 2001; Lings, 2004), the dismantling of organisational silos 
(Christopher et al. 1991; Kelemen, 2000). So far, everything outlined by Jack corresponds 
with what the extant literature leads us to expect. However, he then provides a broader 
context which is potentially troubling: 
 
“About 2008 or 2009, I received a letter from the company pension trustees saying 
that there was a shortfall in the fund of about £50m – just in the UK – which seems a hell 
of a lot of money for a company which has so few staff in this country. It said that they 
had a plan to rectify this. Well, they had already closed the final salary scheme to new 
entrants, so how exactly could they rectify it? Kill off people before they retired? 
[Laughs] I think at that point, I knew what was coming, and sure enough, over the next 
couple of years, the last wave of people to go onto the final salary scheme started to go 
bump in the night [i.e., – disappear unexpectedly]. The earlier recruits appeared to be 
unaffected because many of them were in charge anyway, and the later recruits seemed to 
be unaffected because they were only on a stakeholder salary, but the last people onto the 
final salary scheme started disappearing for spurious reasons. You’d walk into the office 
one day and ask where someone was, and colleagues would answer in hushed tones that 
he’d left suddenly for fiddling expenses or having some sort of disagreement with 
management. This same wave of people would be passed over for promotions and singled 
out for lots of prolonged and unfair criticism in meetings. In effect, they were being 
bullied, harassed and pushed out of the company, and the only ones who got a pay-out 
[i.e., – compromise agreement] were those who could withstand this pressure longer than 
it was economically viable for the company.” 
 
In itself, the scenario Jack describes, though disappointing, is perhaps neither uncommon 
nor surprising. One must also consider the possibility that he has misread the perceived link 
between the pension shortfall and the staff departures, and even the actual reasons for the 
departures. However, he goes on to describe (without any prompting) a change in IM message 
and tone which is consistent with a reduced organisational desire to satisfy and retain certain 
staff: 
 
“About the same time, all the internal messaging went from “I’m ok, you’re ok” to 
“work harder, be better, fit the new order, compete.” Ok, maybe I’m making it sound a 
bit more sinister, but the tone changed from wanting us to feel at home to wanting us to 
aspire to the organisation. It was very sudden and pronounced. They started using 
different words like ‘energy’, ‘flexibility’, ‘passion’, ‘ambition’ and ‘desire’ where 
before they had spoken a lot about ‘experience’, ‘relationships’, ‘continuity’ and 
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‘tradition’. It was quite pronounced. They also started using a much younger and 
Americanised style of speech or writing – quite slangy, and probably the way my kids 
would speak but not the way I would. I know some of my younger and newer colleagues 
were really into it, but it just alienated most of the people my age.” 
 
What Jack describes is not necessarily an intentional shift in IM but may simply represent 
a generational change which has occurred due to older marketers and Human Resources staff 
gradually being replaced by younger ones who adopt tones and messages which reflect their 
experiences of society. The change has certainly made the organisation less attractive for 
older staff and potentially increased the psychic distance between themselves and their 
employer, but there are four possible interpretations: (i) that it is accidentally caused by the 
generation gap and an evolution in working practices; or (ii) that senior managers in the 
organisation have purposely sought such a change to appeal more to younger, newer 
colleagues, or (iii) less to older colleagues, or (iv) both. Thus, what Jack describes may be (i) 
IM which unintentionally demarkets to his segment of employees; (ii) IM which intentionally 
prioritises a different employee segment; (iii) IM which intentionally deprioritises his 
segment relative to others or ID which intentionally targets it; or (iv) IM which intentionally 
deprioritises his segment relative to others and ID which intentionally targets it.  
Whilst Jack’s (possibly inaccurate) linking of the organisation’s economic crisis to its IM 
strategies, and the background context which he provided, suggest that a form of ID might be 
useful to the firm in encouraging some unwanted or costly staff to leave before expensive 
voluntary severance schemes are deemed necessary, data from a much larger range of sources 
are required to give us more confidence in the concept of ID. This materialised during the 
course of the research as roughly a third of participants described other changes in IM tone, 
style or strategy which similarly reflected an environmental change in which reduction of the 
workforce became desirable to the organisation. The second case which we shall examine is 
from the UK Civil Service: 
 
Case 2: Colin, the Former Civil Servant 
Colin had worked as a region-based Civil Servant for around 25 years and attained a 
junior management grade when, in 2013, he was placed into performance management 
measures which eventually led to him accepting a voluntary severance package to leave the 
organisation. He describes some of the IM permeating the UK Civil Service from 2011 until 
2016, and the reception it received from various employees: 
 
“One of the things I noticed is that they tried to make the top brass [senior 
management] seem much less formal and much more approachable. The Perm Sec 
[Permanent Secretary – UK head of Colin’s government department] started putting out 
these internal blogs every week about what an ordinary weekend he had just had like 
everybody else and his reflections on work.” 
 
This seems a very admirable approach to IM, attempting to accentuate commonality 
between staff and management by demonstrating that they share common concerns, such as 
family and colleagues, although Colin’s phrase, “tried to make [them] seem” expresses 
cynicism at what he may have considered a false self-portrayal. It certainly does not 
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demonstrate the “quality of working life unconcern” constituent of Vasconcelos’ (2008) ID. 
Colin continues: 
 
“They were obviously trying to change the culture of the Civil Service from this old-
fashioned, ‘old school tie’ [i.e., – privately educated men in key positions], One Nation 
Conservative kind of mindset to something a bit more competitive and corporate. And of 
course, streamlined. Francis Maude [government minister in charge of the Civil Service] 
had said he wanted to reduce numbers greatly, and also said that he wanted a different 
culture.” 
 
Indeed he had, although not without contradiction. The government promised to appoint 
300,000 civil service apprentices by 2020 without cutting current roles to achieve this 
(Cabinet Office, 2016), then stated that overall numbers should be reduced “to create space to 
allow for the recruitment of apprentices” by offering voluntary severance packages whilst 
telling those offered that future packages are likely to be substantially smaller – in effect, 
leveraging on the availability heuristic as a threat to achieve their means. Confusingly, Maude 
(2013) had posited that, although he desired cultural change, “you don’t change the culture by 
trying to change the culture,” so his stance towards IM was unclear. Colin noted that 
contradictory messages also undermined IM: 
 
“There was this idea running through the ethos of the Civil Service which they 
wanted us all to buy into, and that was the idea that we should all buy into each other’s 
success. We should all try to help each other to do better and to be better, rather than just 
thinking about our own little side of the fence. And that was really reinforced time and 
time again in emails from Whitehall [HQ of the UK Civil Service], Perm Sec speeches at 
town hall meetings, and in other forms of communications.” 
 
So far so good. By encouraging staff to treat each other as ‘internal customers’ (Berry, 
1981; Ballantyne, 1997), interacting more (Varey, 1995; Voima, 2001; Lings, 2004), 
transferring knowledge (Gounaris, 2006), and dismantling silos (Christopher et al. 1991; 
Kelemen, 2000), staff performance could be improved (Berry & Parasuraman, 1991), IM 
could change the organisation (Reardon & Enis, 1990) and the organisational culture could be 
managed (Gummesson, 1987; Piercy & Morgan, 1991) (should Maude find the idea viable). 
In all of the above respects, the UK Civil Service had ‘textbook’ IM rationale for their 
strategies. However, this was undermined by self-contradiction: 
 
“All the time that they were telling us to commit to each other’s success, they were 
also targeting us, measuring our performances, against each other. So for example, if you 
were in the bottom quarter of staff against a certain bunch of measures at your annual 
appraisal, you would be placed in performance management. Only they called it “needing 
development,” to make it sound more as though they were helping you to become a 
better, more fulfilled member of staff. And if you went into this category – which was all 
based on your line manager’s subjective opinions of your work, by the way – you had to 
hit the new targets which they gave you otherwise you would get a series of warnings and 
be shown the door [i.e., – dismissed]. It’s all over the place. They also tell you that you’re 
now guaranteed five days’ training. Well, we always were. So it’s just being 
disingenuous, pretending to give us something that we’d not already got.” 
David M. Brown 14 
There is certainly a glaring contradiction here which explains Colin’s cynicism and 
cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957) in the face of his organisation’s IM. In attempting to 
make the Civil Service conform to private sector expectations of competition and 
performance, it was placing staff into a ‘rank and yank’ exercise in which the lowest ranked, 
even if performing extremely well, would be punished. In reducing Civil Service headcount 
by one fifth between 2010 and 2015 – the five years of the Conservative-Liberal Coalition 
government focused heavily on implementing swingeing austerity measures to shrink the 
state – ministers had proposed to support the bottom 10% of all staff to improvement and 
then, if unsuccessful, dismiss them (Bowie, 2015). Colin goes on to explain how IM 
initiatives were perceived differently across sections of the workforce: 
 
“We found that the people coming up with these messages were unwittingly trying to 
appeal to their own. You know, the people in these senior posts are high achievers, public 
school educated, from very well-off families, and have had this senior executive lifestyle 
their whole working lives which are a million miles removed from someone like me, who 
is just an ordinary guy trying to pay the mortgage and live in his hometown. We’d get 
these messages saying, “Great news, there’s a town hall meeting in London tomorrow 
morning – turn up and take part,” and of course, the people here in the regions were 
thinking, “well, how the hell can I do that when I work several hours’ away?” But you’d 
also get these messages coming out which said that people should be mobile. They 
should move offices regularly – move regions or take positions in London – to get a 
breadth of experience and a holistic understanding of the Civil Service. Well, of course, 
this goes down great with your Fast Trackers [young graduates on the accelerated 
promotion scheme] and your thrusting young types who expect to be Perm Sec within six 
months, but it’s no good at all for people who are tied to one office because they have 
families and mortgages and they value the fact that they have been doing the same job for 
years and are very good at it.” 
 
Whilst it is undoubtedly desirable for employees to gain a holistic understanding of their 
organisation, and to have opportunities for mobility, by stating that it is almost a prerequisite 
of success closes the doors to those wishing to remain in one office, and is likely to be very 
alienating – effectively saying that their behaviours and choices are inconsistent with the 
organisation’s values, whilst transmitting a message which is very attractive to others. This 
raises the tricky question of intent. If the Civil Service sees the Fast Trackers as the vital 
talent of tomorrow, the future leaders who must be retained, and the region-based old hands 
as expensive (in terms of accrued pension entitlements), intransigent (in terms of immobility) 
and incompatible with their desired values, does it therefore follow that the Civil Service 
would try to target IM at its preferred target audience whilst knowingly turning off its less 
preferred audience segment? Taking the question even further, could it deliberately seek to 
alienate the latter segment of the audience simultaneously – in the way that a private club 
might court prestigious members whilst trying to get ‘rid of the undesirables’? This question 
shall remain almost impossible to answer with certainty, either in the context of the UK Civil 
Service or other organisations, but by placing into a broader environmental context the two 
case studies used here (plus numerous others used in the larger research project), we can at 
least entertain the possibility that a combination of four types of ID have been at play, and 
these are discussed next. 
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KEY FINDINGS 
 
Using the categories of demarketing examined earlier and applying them into an IM/ID 





This category of ID corresponds to Vasconcelos’ (2008) notion of well-intentioned but 
botched IM. It results from a lack of ability or knowledge within the organisation, especially 
in terms of awareness of employees’ needs. In this category, there is no segmentation of the 
internal audience, although the ID may not be equally negative to all staff. For example, if the 
Civil Service had genuinely not considered the possibility that some employees might value 
continuity and a settled home over mobility and promotion, then it would not have purposely 
segmented its audience or sought to demarket, but it would have a more deleterious effect 





By promising to guarantee a level of training which was already in place, but trumpeting 
it as a new initiative, an organisation is giving the impression of marketing, whilst actually 
demarketing – in this instance, ostensible IM. Whilst knowledge of employee needs is 
required, respect for employees is low and it is a covert strategy. Moreover, even though it 
may apply on an unsegmented basis, it cannot be unintentional. It is a deliberate choice made 





By segmenting its employee audience and targeting preferred staff members with positive 
and constructive IM approaches, an organisation could nurture its talent. Arguably, there is an 
overlap between selective IM and ‘succession management’. It requires knowledge of the 
internal market and an awareness of different staff’s needs and may not necessarily target the 





Just as selective demarketing aims to rid an organisation of its less desirable customers 
whilst retaining the more desirable ones, so selective ID uses the same knowledge of staff 
needs as selective IM to segment the internal audience, but rather than intentionally targeting 
preferred staff with positive approaches, it intentionally targets less preferred staff with 
negative approaches, demarketing the organisation to them as an employer. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Whilst ID evidently occurred in both the above cases, and in numerous others within the 
research, it is difficult to ascertain if it constituted Unintentional ID – the well-intentioned but 
botched form of IM described by Vasconcelos (2008) – or if it qualified as Ostensible IM, 
Selective IM, Selective ID, or a combination thereof. As those actors responsible for ID are 
extremely unlikely to admit it to a researcher, there are perhaps only three plausible ways in 
which organisational intent can be supposed likely: (i) if a former employee or a whistle-
blower admits, either to the researcher or a third party within the public domain, to 
demarketing their organisation intentionally to staff, and even then their motives and 
interpretations must be scrutinised to ensure they are not speaking without full knowledge of 
the facts or with a desire to damage their former employer; (ii) if a large body of publicly 
available information can provide a context which makes organisational intent likely on the 
balance of probability, as was the case for the UK Civil Service; and possibly (iii) through 
triangulation of data – for instance, by interviewing numerous independent employees within 
the same organisation to check for commonality of themes, and by undertaking Peer 
Debriefing (Lincoln & Guba, 1985) to double check the legitimacy of one’s interpretations. 
One of the contexts which presented itself repeatedly within the broader data set was the 
publicly acknowledged need for an organisation to cut its wage bill, head count and staff 
costs. In almost all of the instances where participants had become marginalised or alienated 
by IM which they considered intentionally unattractive (i.e., – ID), information was available 
in the public domain which suggested the organisation was experiencing a financial downturn 
indicated by a drop in profits or turnover. Some organisations, which cannot be identified, 
had been the subject of speculation within broadcast and print media outlets, as they had lost 
key sales accounts or sought to renegotiate overheads such as rent. Contrastingly, of all the 
organisations within the broader study of IM where participants perceived the IM approaches 
as either neutral or positive but never negative (intentionally or otherwise), none embarked 
upon rationalisation, reduced their headcount by more than approximately 5%, publicly stated 
an intention to reduce costs, or were the subject of media speculation regarding their financial 
viability. Whilst correlation and causation are beyond the scope of this qualitative study – 
partially because ID was not the intended focus of the research but a major unanticipated 
theme emerging from it – the numbers involved certainly suggest a ‘smoking gun’ for future 
positivist research to explore. Likewise, all the demarketing organisations appeared to be 
experiencing or recovering from financial crises due to either macroenvironmental reasons 
(e.g., – the 2007-2009 Financial Crisis), microenvironmental factors (e.g., – increased 
competitor actions, sharpening customer demands, or the loss of a key sales account), or both. 
However, no attempt has been made here to examine whether macro- or 
microenvironmentally influenced crises are more likely to result in ID, or how each may 
influence the nature of that ID. These are questions to be taken up in subsequent research into 
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